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Recent Developments
proceeding or the state attorney's indictment,98 or to enact specific statutory
provisions providing that all witnesses summoned to appear and testify at the
inquest shall be entitled to have counsel present throughout to represent them,
to confront and cross-examine other witnesses, to object to proffered evidence,
to present evidence and to compel the attendance of witnesses.
The Home Rule Dilemma in
the District of Columbia
Almost two hundred years have passed since the Declaration of Independence
was written and issued to King George III of England. One of the principles
set forth in that document declares that a government derives its "just powers
from the consent of the governed."' Eleven years later a Constitutional
Convention convened and began the difficult task of drafting a document
which sought, among other things, to "establish Justice" and to "promote the
general Welfare" of the citizens of the United States.2  Despite the basic
ideals portrayed by these two instruments, there exists within the United
States a government whose justness and concern for promoting the general
welfare of its citizens has been seriously questioned, since it is a government
which derives its powers through means other than the consent of the gov-
erned. The government adverted to is that of the District of Columbia.
During the past twenty years home rule advocates for the District have in-
creased their efforts in an attempt to gain what they consider to be one of the
basic rights of all citizens-the right to choose those officials who are to exer-
cise governmental authority over them. Thus far the opponents of home
rule have successfully repelled the arguments which have been presented in
behalf of self-government for the Nation's Capital.
3
That Congress has the power to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever" over the District of Columbia is established in the Constitution
98. This alternative appears preferable in that it would not only alleviate constitu-
tional infirmities resulting from application of the Jenkins rationale to inquest situa-
tions, but would also minimize possibilities of infringement on the right to trial by
jury resulting from prejudicial pretrial publicity in conjunction with the inquest. That
jurors be impartial and indifferent and that they reach a verdict based only on evi-
dence adduced during the trial are fundamental principles inherent in the concept of
trial by jury. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
1. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.
2. U.S. CONST. preamble.
3. Basically, there are three major arguments submitted by home rule proponents:
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of the United States. 4  Very little was said at the Constitutional Con-
vention about the section providing for the future seat of the national gov-
ernment, therefore it is necessary to explore other sources to gather the in-
tent of the drafters when they formulated this provision. James Madison in
The Federalist Papers explains, to some degree, what the drafters had in
mind when they included the provision for the seat of the government.5 They
envisioned a stationary residence for the general government which would be
independent of the control of any single state, thus protecting members of the
national government against any prejudices." Noting that the District was to
be formed by the cession of territory from two states (Maryland and Vir-
ginia), Madison wrote:
as the inhabitants will find sufficient inducements of interest, to
become willing parties to the cession; as they will have had their
voice in the election of the government, which is to exercise author-
ity over them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, de-
rived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them
• . . every imaginable objection seems to be obviated.7
Advocates of home rule argue that this strengthens their position as to the
intentions of the Founding Fathers concerning the District of Columbia.
Whether Madison was speaking for the drafters of the Constitution is not cer-
tain since records of the Convention pertaining to the seat of government
provision are sketchy.s  However, there is no reason to discredit his ob-
servations.
(1) District residents should have a right to choose their own government; (2) the
burden of legislating for the District is both time-consuming and bothersome to Con-
gress; and (3) the government would be better, since popularly elected officials would
be more responsive to District residents. Arguments against home rule for the District
include: (1) bills proposed are deceptive and do not really provide for home rule,
since they still leave the federal government with much control; (2) delegation of
extensive power to a local government would violate article I, section 8 of the Consti-
tution; (3) none of the proposed home rule bills gives promise of improving the local
government; (4) history indicates that home rule would be unwise; (5) the city would
find it difficult to get a substantial federal payment, since Congress would lose its
sense of responsibility for District affairs; (6) local and federal government would have
conflicting interests; (7) the legitimate interest of the federal government in the capital
city would be undermined. M. DERTHICK, CITY POLITICS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 170-
74 (1962) [hereinafter cited as DERTmICK]. See also Byrd, District of Columbia
"Home Rule," 16 AM. U.L. REv. 254 (1967); Tydings, Home Rule for the District of
Columbia: The Case for Political Justice, 16 AM. U.L. REv. 271 (1967).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
5. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 339 (Hamilton ed. 1909) (Madison).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. The delegates to the Convention were more concerned about where the seat of
government would be rather than what it would be. See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 127 (1937).
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History of Government in the District
The government of the District has undergone much reorganization since
congressional acceptance of the ceded territory in 1790.9 Initially there were
five units of local government in the District-the county of Washington;
the city of Washington; the city of Georgetown ceded by the State of Mary-
land; and the county and city of Alexandria ceded by the State of Virginia. 10
The city of Georgetown on the Maryland side and Alexandria on the Virginia
side each had a separate, popularly elected government." Prior to incorpora-
tion of the city of Washington in 1802, the District was governed by three
commissioners appointed by the President.' 2 The act of incorporation of
the District provided for a mayor-council form of municipal government.18
While the mayor was to be appointed annually by the President, the people
were given the power to elect the twelve-member city council. 14 The District
municipal government was reorganized in 181215 at which time Congress
replaced the mayor-council system with a combination of an eight-member
Board of Aldermen and a twelve-member Common Council, both of which
were to be popularly elected. 16
In 1820, Congress again set out to reorganize the local government. This
time they retained the bicameral legislature, and in addition provided for a
popularly elected mayor, who was to serve a two-year term.' 7 This form of
home rule continued until the 1870's, when racial and political factors and a
critical financial situation prompted Congress to gradually eliminate the home
rule form of government.' 8 In 1871 Congress merged Georgetown and the
city of Washington into one municipal corporation under a territorial form of
government consisting of a presidentially-appointed governor and a bicam-
eral legislature made up of a presidentially-appointed eleven-member Council
and a twenty-two-member House of Delegates elected popularly.19 In addi-
tion, the District was permitted to have a nonvoting delegate to the House of
Representatives. 20 This form of government was short-lived, lasting only three
9. Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, § 1, 1 Stat. 130.
10. DERTHICK 37.
11. COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 116-17 (1964).
12. Pursuant to Act of July 16, 1790, ch. 28, §§ 2, 3, 1 Stat. 130.
13. Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 53, §§ 2, 3, 5, 2 Stat. 195.
14. Id. §§ 2, 5.
15. Act of May 4, 1812, ch. 75, § 1, 2 Stat. 721.
16. Id. § 3.
17. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 104, § 3, 3 Stat. 583, 584.
18. See DERTHICK 38; J. KEELEY, DEMOCRACY OR DESPOTISM IN THE AMERICAN
CAPITAL (1939); J. WHYTE, THE UNCIVIL WAR (1958).
19. Act of Feb. 21, 1871, ch. 62, §§ 2, 5, 16 Stat. 419, 420-21.
20. Id. § 34. This is the only congressional representation that the District has
ever had. Norton P. Chipman was the first and only delegate to be elected by District
1969]
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years before Congress established a government run by a three-member com-
mission appointed by the President.21 Congress confirmed this system four
years later in the Organic Act of the District of Columbia, 22 and this system
prevailed until 1967. The present system was established under a presidential
reorganization plan which became effective in August 1967.23 It provides for
a mayor-council form of government, the members of which are presidentially-
appointed; 24 with the appointed mayor assuming much of the power previously
given to the three commissioners.
At first glance it would appear that the denial of popular election of city
officials and the lack of congressional representation violates article IV, sec-
tion 4 of the Constitution, which guarantees a republican form of government.
Federal courts, however, have refused to handle questions involving this pro-
vision, based on the Supreme Court's dictum in Luther v. Borden25 stating
that questions arising under this provision of the Constitution are of a po-
litical rather than judicial character.
26
The Political Question Dilemma
In Hobson v. Tobriner,27 where citizens of the District attempted to enjoin the
President from appointing three commissioners of the District, one of the
citizens. One of the major duties of the delegate was to sit on the Committee on the
District of Columbia. His effectiveness, however, was hampered by his disqualifica-
tion from voting. See J. WHYTE, THE UNCIVIL WAR 107-09 (1958).
21. Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 337, § 2, 18 Stat. 116.
22. Act of June 11, 1878, ch. 180, § 2, 20 Stat. 102, 103.
23. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, 81 Stat. 948 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Reorganization Plan]. The Reorganization Act of 1949 granted the President the
power to reorganize'governmental agencies, including the District of Columbia gov-
ernment, in order to provide for the effective functioning of the federal government.
5 U.S.C. §§ 901-13 (1964).
24. Reorganization Plan, §§ 201, 301.
25. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1848).
26. Id. at 40-43. The case arose out of Dorr's Rebellion of 1841. Several citizens
became discontented with the 1663 Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Planta-
tions, which provided for extremely limited suffrage and no way for amending this
provision. In an attempt to rectify the situation many of these citizens took it upon
themselves to elect a constitutional convention by universal manhood suffrage. The
result of the convention was the formation of a new government which was subse-
quently adopted by a majority of the male qualified voters. The new government had
to be abandoned after it failed to uphold its authority through the force of arms.
It was during one of the skirmishes that the case developed. The plaintiff, Martin
Luther, brought an action of trespass against Luther Borden and others. The defend-
ants maintained that they had a right to break into Luther's house and arrest him,
since they alleged that he was involved in the rebellion. Luther contended that his
actions were justified since the Charter Government's authority had been annulled by
the citizens of Rhode Island. Therefore, he contended his actions were in support of
the lawful authority of the state, while Borden was in arms against it. Id. at 34-35.
27. 255 F. Supp. 295 (D.D.C.), order denying petition, Hobson v. Gasch, No.
20,388 (D.C. Cir., Sept. 29, 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 914 (1967).
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principal arguments was that such appointments violated the right of the
residents of the District to have a republican form of government. The
district court dismissed the plaintiff's application for a three-judge federal dis-
trict court, one of the grounds being that questions arising under article IV,
section 4 were of a "political" nature and therefore not within the jurisdic-
tion of the court.28 The court refused to even discuss the merits of the ques-
tion presented, the sole basis for this refusal being the dictum of Luther v.
Borden.
Because of the impact of the decision in Luther v. Borden on questions
arising under the Guaranty Clause, it is necessary to examine closely the hold-
ing of that case. The only question presented to the Court in Luther was
which of the two governments existing in Rhode Island in 1841 was legiti-
mate and lawful.29 The Court refused to decide the issue on the ground that
the question was "political" and therefore "beyond its appropriate sphere of
action."'30  The actual holding was that Congress or the President had the
sole power to determine which of two contending state governments was
legitimate.31 The basis for the holding was that the latter clauses of article
IV, section 4, and a statute enacted in 1795,82 conferred on the President the
power to call forth the militia to stop insurrection upon application by the
proper governmental authority of the state. As a result, the President had
an implied obligation to determine which of the two governments was legiti-
mate. The Court found that, while the President never really summoned the
militia, he did recognize the old governor as the executive authority in
Rhode Island, and furthermore, that he had made arrangements to send the
militia to the governor's aid if necessary.
33
A literal reading of the Court's opinion would lead one to believe that
only the President and Congress have a duty to fulfill the guarantee. Section
4, however, provides that "The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government. . . ." It is arguable, then,
that the judicial branch of the United States Government has an equal duty,
along with the executive and legislative branches, to handle cases arising un-
der the first clause of article IV, section 4. In Hobson v. Tobriner, the district
court was not being called upon to determine which of two governments was
28. Id. In addition to their argument under article IV, section 4, the plaintiffs
alleged that appointment of the three commissioners violated the fifth, ninth, tenth,
fifteenth and nineteenth amendments. All of the claims were dismissed as not pre-
senting substantial constitutional questions.
29. 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 38-39, 46.
30. Id. at 46-47.
31. See Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1900).
32. Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36, § 1, 1 Stat. 424.
33. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 44 (1848).
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legitimate, rather the court was asked to determine whether the existing gov-
ernment in the District of Columbia was violative of the guarantee of a re-
publican form of government. Unfortunately, the dictum, not the actual hold-
ing of Luther v. Borden, was the basis for the decision in Hobson v. Tobriner,
as it has been the grounds for most questions brought under the Guaranty
Clause. The net result of the strict adherence by the courts to the dictum can
be described as no less than a paralyzation of the first clause of article IV, sec-
tion 4. It does not seem logical that this was the intention of the drafters of the
Constitution, especially since they wanted a flexible and workable document.
Such automatic and indiscriminate classification by courts of all questions
arising under article IV, section 4 is hardly flexible. In light of Baker v.
Carr34 and more recently Powell v. McCormack,s5 the precedent of Luther
v. Borden requires closer scrutiny to reassess the validity of the Court's dictum
that all questions arising under article IV, section 4 are "political" and there-
fore nonjusticiable.
Powell v. McCormack indicates that federal courts should apply the test of
jurisdiction over the subject matter as announced in Bell v. Hood,36 and if
there is proper jurisdiction, the courts should apply the test of a political ques-
tion discussed at length in Baker v. Carr.37  In Hobson v. Tobriner, the
court did not apply any tests when it refused the application for a three-judge
district court. Simply stated, the test for jurisdiction is whether the claims
involved will be sustained if the Constitution is given one construction and
will be defeated if it is given another.38 Upon applying this test to the District
situation, the result is: If the District of Columbia is considered a "state"
for the purposes of article IV, section 4, then whether or not there is a re-
publican form of government can be examined. If article IV, section 4 is
construed not to include the District of Columbia, then whether or not there
is a republican form of government cannot be examined. Assuming that a
court might follow this analysis and find jurisdiction, then the court must
34. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). See notes 37 and 39 infra and accompanying text.
35. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
36. 327 U.S. 678 (1946). The case arose from a suit in the federal district
court to recover damages for alleged violations of the fourth and fifth amendments.
The district judge dismissed the suit on the ground that the action was not one aris-
ing under the Constitution or the laws of the United States. The Supreme Court
reversed and held that there was federal jurisdiction. Id. at 680-82.
37. This case arose when several citizens of Tennessee instituted an action to gain a
declaration that the Tennessee Apportionment Act of 1901 was unconstitutional. The
district court dismissed the action on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment below, holding that the district
court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter, and that the petitioners were entitled
to appropriate relief.
38. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946).
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decide whether a political question is presented. Baker v. Carr listed some
of the attributes of political questions:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.
8 9
While the question of whether the District government is a republican one
might be considered political under the above definition, the courts should at
least determine whether or not the District is to be considered a "state" under
article IV, section 4. It is only logical that a court should decide if the pro-
vision is applicable, before turning to the issue of whether the government is
republican.
The Status of the District for Purposes of Article IV, Section 4
Once it is shown that there is justification for asserting that the court could
find jurisdiction over the subject matter, the two main questions for the courts
to consider are: (1) Is the District of Columbia a "state" within the mean-
ing of article IV, section 4? (2) If so, is its government, created by act of
Congress in 1967, republican in form?
To date there has not been a judicial determination of whether the District
is a "state" for the purposes of article IV, section 4. In Hepburn v. Ellzey,
40
Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, determined that the District
was not a state within the meaning of article III, and therefore a District
citizen could not maintain an action against a citizen of another state in the
circuit court for that state's district.4 ' Hepburn remained the law until 1940
when Congress expanded the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts to include
controversies between citizens of "the Territories, the District of Columbia,
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."'42 The power of Congress to enact
this grant of federal jurisdiction was challenged in National Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.43 While upholding the constitutionality of the
39. 369 U.S. at 217.
40. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1804).
41. Id. at 452-53.
42. Act of April 20, 1940, ch. 117, § 41, 59 Stat. 143, as amended, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d) (1964).
43. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
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statute as a proper exercise of the power of Congress under article I of the
Constitution, two members of the Court joined in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson which refused to overrule Hepburn for the purposes of article III.44
Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion, which was joined in by Justice Murphy,
indicated, however, that the Hepburn decision might have been wrongly
decided:
Despite its great age and subsequent acceptance, I think the Hep-
burn decision was ill-considered and wrongly decided. Nothing
hangs on it now except the continuance or removal of a gross and
wholly anomalous inequality applied against a substantial group
of American citizens, not in relation to their substantive rights,
but in respect to the forums available for their determination. 45
In addition Justice Rutledge stated:
Marshall's sole premise of decision in the Hepburn case has failed,
under the stress of time and later decision, as a test of constitu-
tional construction. Key words like "state," "citizen," and "per-
son" do not always and invariably mean the same thing.46
Texas v. White47 supports Justice Rutledge's assertion that certain words
mean one thing in one section of the Constitution, but take on a different con-
struction elsewhere. In that case the Supreme Court considered what the
term "state" means for the purpose of article IV, section 4. Chief Justice
Chase, writing for the Court, defined "state" in this context as a "political
community, as distinguished from a government. '48 Based on this rather
broad definition it is not difficult to see how the District of Columbia might
qualify as a "state," thus entitling it to a republican form of government. Even
if the District is considered to be a "state" in a very qualified sense, as was
stated by the Court in Metropolitan R.R. v. District of Columbia,49 there
is no reason to presume that the qualifications for being a "state" in the con-
text of the Constitutional provision under consideration have not been met.
The federal courts have the ability to determine whether the District should
qualify in this instance, but thus far they have preferred to avoid the problem
by declaring such questions to be "political" and therefore nonjusticiable.
Is the District Government "Republican?"
Having determined that there is substantial legal justification for considering
44. Id. at 587-88.
45. Id. at 625.
46. Id. at 623.
47. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869).
48. id. at 721.
49. 132 U.S. 1, 9 (1889).
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the District to be a "state" within the framework of article IV, section 4, the
next step is to discuss whether or not the present government conforms to
the traditional notions of a republican form of government. Once again
Madison's observations in The Federalist Papers provide a valuable source
for the purposes of definition. He defines a republic as
a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people, and is administered by per-
sons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or
during good behavior. It is essential to such a government, that
it be derived from the great body of the society .... 60
During the Constitutional Convention, Madison noted that the right of suf-
frage was "one of the fundamental articles of republican Government."' ,1 In
re Duncan52 provides a definition formulated by the Supreme Court on this
subject: "By the Constitution, a republican form of government is guaran-
teed to every State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form
is the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental ad-
minstration . ... ,," The distinguishing feature of that form does not exist
in the present governmental structure of the District, nor has that feature
been a part of the local government since 1874. Many state courts have
held that the principle of having a republican government does not apply to
local government.5 4 Federal courts have consistently refused to consider the
issue under the rationale of the political question doctrine. However, it
would appear that the state courts have incorrectly narrowed the definition of
"state" established by the Supreme Court in Texas v. White.55 The most
expedient way to solve the dilemma would be for the federal courts to exer-
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 302 (Hamilton ed. 1909) (Madison).
51. 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 203 (1937). This
position is supported by a modem writer on the Constitution, who commented:
"'Republican Government,' beyond the possibility of argument, is representative govern-
ment; and since the representative character of any government necessarily depends
upon the popular right to vote, it inevitably results that the popular right of voting in
the government of our states, and of voting therein in an effective way, is the thing to
which this national guaranty most essentially appertains." 1 W. CROSSKEY, PoLrTcs
AND THE CONSTITUTION 523 (1953).
52. 139 U.S. 449 (1891).
53. Id. at 461. See also Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175-76
(1874).
54. See In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 88 P. 270 (1906); Sarlls v. State ex rel.
Trimble, 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270 (1929); State ex rel. Porterie v. Smith, 184 La. 263,
166 So. 72 (1935); Hopkins v. Duluth, 81 Minn. 189, 83 N.W. 536 (1900); Walker v.
Spokane, 62 Wash. 312, 113 P. 775 (1911).
55. See Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 525 n.51 (1962).
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cise their proper jurisdiction and determine the status of the District in regard
to article IV, section 4.
Recent Home Rule Legislation
Currently two bills have passed the Senate which could be important steps
in an attempt to give the District a more representative government.56 The
first is a bill providing for a nonvoting delegate to the House of Represen-
tatives.57 This delegate would be popularly elected by citizens of the Dis-
trict. The second bill proposes the establishment of a fifteen-member com-
mission on government for the District of Columbia. 8 The purpose behind
this bill is an examination of the feasibility and desirability of various methods
by which
(1) the structure of the District government may be improved,
(2) the District of Columbia may be granted a greater measure
of self-government than presently exists, and (3) the District of
Columbia government can promote economy, efficiency, and im-
proved service in the transaction of the public business in the de-
partments, agencies, and independent instrumentalities of the Dis-
trict government. 9
The proposed commission would consist of two senators, two members of the
House of Representatives, five presidential appointees, four popularly elected
members, the District Commissioner and the Chairman of the District of
Columbia Council. 60 Perhaps the combined efforts of a delegate to the
House of Representatives and a commission on District government will help
bring an end to the present, highly questionable, form of local government.
The Supreme Court has already indicated that home rule for the District
is constitutional. 61 It has not, however, established whether or not denial of
such a government to the District is unconstitutional under article IV, section
4. In Downes v. Bidwel 62 the Court, in important dicta, discussed the Con-
stitution's applicability to the District of Columbia and stated: "The Con-
stitution had attached to it irrevocably. . . . The mere cession of the Dis-
trict of Columbia to the Federal government relinquished the authority of the
States, but it did not take it out of the United States or from under the aegis of
the Constitution. ' 63 It should follow that the provision for a republican form
56. President Nixon's message to the Congress outlined the substance of the two
bills. 115 CoNG. REC. 4191 (daily ed. April 29, 1969).
57. S. 2163, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). This bill was passed by the Senate on
October 1, 1969. 115 CONG. REc. 11708 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1969).
58. S. 2164, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). This bill was passed by the Senate at
the same time as S. 2163, and both have been sent to the House of Representatives for
further action. 115 CoNG. REC. 11712 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1969).
59. 115 CONG. REC. 11713 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1969).
60. Id. at 11712.
61. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 108-10 (1953).
62. 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
63. Id. at 261.
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of government is just as applicable to the District after the cession as it had
been applicable to the states of Maryland and Virginia before the cession,
and therefore the citizens of the ceded territory did not relinquish their right
to said form of government.
In conclusion, it appears that the federal courts have a duty under the
Constitution to re-evaluate the status of the District of Columbia in regard
to article IV, section 4. In light of the decisions in Baker v. Carr and more
recently Powell v. McCormack, the courts, if given the opportunity, should
reconsider the rationale of cases such as Hobson v. Tobriner. Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison states: "If, then, the courts are to
regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act
of the legislature, the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the
case to which they both apply."' 64 The government of the District of Colum-
bia was created by an ordinary act of Congress; it is within the capacity of the
courts to test that act for its constitutionality under article IV, section 4.
Both Congress and the President have failed to provide the District with a
representative government, and any change in the near future is not apparent.
The unconstitutionality of the District government speaks for itself, since it is
neither representative nor is it popularly elected. There does not seem to be
any persuasive reason why the courts cannot handle such an issue, except
the fear of overruling the precedent set in Luther v. Borden. Unless the
courts act on the problem posed by the form of government in the Nation's
Capital, some citizens will never realize true democracy.
The Federal Communications Commission and
Cigarette Advertising
In 1934 Congress established the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) and directed it to observe the "public interest" in its regulation of the
broadcasting industry.' Aiming to fulfill this broad congressional directive,
the FCC in recent years has taken two controversial steps in an effort to
regulate the advertising of cigarettes on radio and television. One was the
so-called "cigarette decision" in which the FCC held that the presentation of
cigarette commercials constituted an exposition of one side of a controversial
issue of public importance and thus imposed an affirmative duty on a broad-
64. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
1. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 307, 309(a), 403, 407, 409 (1964).
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